Organizational Factors in Commercial Aviation Accidents 1990-2000 by von Thaden, Terry L. et al.
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology - 2005 
International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology 
2005 
Organizational Factors in Commercial Aviation Accidents 
1990-2000 
Terry L. von Thaden 
Douglas A. Wiegmann 
Scott A. Shappell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005 
 Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
von Thaden, T. L., Wiegmann, D. A., & Shappell, S. A. (2005). Organizational Factors in Commercial 
Aviation Accidents 1990-2000. 2005 International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 801-805. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2005/123 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the International Symposium on Aviation Psychology at 
CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Symposium on Aviation Psychology - 2005 by an 
authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS IN COMMERCIAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS 1990-2000
Terry L. von Thaden and Douglas A. Wiegmann
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Champaign, IL
Scott A. Shappell
Federal Aviation Administration Civil Aeromedical Institute
Oklahoma City, OK
Recently several major transportation accidents have brought significant attention to the role of organizational
factors in supporting safety within high-risk critical systems. However, little is essentially known about the types of
organizational factors that contribute to these accidents, as there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of these
factors. This paper elaborates on the types of organizational factors that have contributed to pilot-error related
aviation accidents in U.S. commercial aviation. Specifically, we analyzed 60 accidents with organizational cause
factors from 1990-2000. Results from this analysis indicate that the type and frequency of organizational factors that
contribute to accidents varies across type and size of aviation operations. However, the data also argue for a more
thorough analysis of organizational factors during an investigation so that a clearer understanding of the actual
contributing factors to an accident involving pilot error can be discerned.
Introduction
Organizational factors play a significant role in the
foundation of safety in high-risk systems. Several
high profile accidents in the late twentieth century
brought considerable attention to the role of
organizational factors in accident causation. One of
the first instances was the nuclear accident at
Chernobyl in 1986. The International Atomic Energy
Agency identified a “poor safety culture” as a factor
contributing to this disaster (IAEA, 1986, as cited in
Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998). Since that time,
organizational factors have been discussed in other
major accident enquiries and analyses of system
failures such as the King’s Cross underground
subway  fire  in  London  and  the  Piper  Alpha  oil
platform  explosion  in  the  North  Sea  (Cox  &  Flin,
1998; Pidgeon, 1998). Organizational factors also
began to appear in the discussions of several high
profile aviation/aerospace accidents such as the
Challenger disaster (Vaughan, 1996).
The turning point for the analysis of organizational
factors within commercial aviation accidents came
with the National Transportation Safety Board’s
(NTSB) report of the in-flight structural breakup and
crash of Continental Express Flight 2574 near Eagle
Lake, Texas, on September 11, 1991 (Meshkati,
1997). One Board member, in a dissenting opinion,
suggested that the probable cause of this accident
included, “The failure of Continental Express
management to establish a corporate culture which
encouraged and enforced adherence to approved
maintenance and quality assurance procedures”
(NTSB, 1992, p.54). Since then, the focus on
organizational factors in aviation and aerospace
accidents has continued to expand to include the
recent analysis of the organizational failures within
NASA that contributed to the Columbia Space
Shuttle tragedy (CAIB, 2003).
The role organizational factors play in the etiology of
accidents has been acknowledged prior to the
aforementioned accidents. For example, March and
Simon (1958), in their influential work Organizations,
describe organizations as complex systems whose
failings are more often directed at administrative
factors, rather than at operator (worker) behavior.
Likewise, Heinrich, Peterson, and Roos (1959),
discuss organizational opportunities for accident
prevention efforts in their work Industrial Accident
Prevention. Bird’s (1974) Domino Theory
fundamentally traces the root causes of all accidents to
failures in organizational loss control and has been a
standard model of accident causation within industrial
and manufacturing settings for decades. More recent
theories of organizational accidents build on these and
other foundations, including works by Reason (1990;
1997), Weick and Roberts (1993), Klein, Bigely, and
Roberts (1995), and Zhuravlyov (1997).
But what is actually known about the types of
organizational factors that contribute directly to
accidents, namely commercial aviation “pilot error”
type accidents? There is a growing body of
knowledge in relation to the role that aircrew or pilot
error  plays  in  the  cause  of  aviation  accidents.  For
years,  the  unsafe  actions  on  the  part  of  the  pilots  as
accident causal factors have hovered around 80%
(Dismukes, Young, & Sumwalt, 1999; Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2003). This is not surprising since pilots’
actions are more easily tied to the occurrence of an
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accident, whereas organizational factors are generally
far removed in time and space from an accident,
making them difficult to link to an accident during an
investigation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001). In
addition, accident investigators are often highly
knowledgeable of the tasks and duties of the accident
aircrew  that  may  have  gone  awry,  but  may  be
generally uninformed as to the types of
organizational issues that they should specifically
examine during an investigation.
Accordingly, there is debate that despite a growing
awareness of the importance of organizational
factors, they have been often overlooked or
unidentified by aviation accident investigators in the
field (Yacavone, 1993; Maurino, Reason, Johnston,
& Lee, 1995). That is, most field investigations refer
to the pilot’s erroneous decision or action with little
understanding of the contributing factors committed
by those within the organizational chain of command.
This is not to say that aviation accidents may be
completely devoid of causal factors on the part of the
pilot(s), but rather to note that the emphasis most
often has been placed on the frontline operators,
rather than tracing back up the organizational chain.
This paper elaborates on the types of organizational
factors that have contributed to commercial aviation
accidents in the U.S. Specifically, we analyzed 60
accidents with organizational cause factors from
1990-2000.
Method
We analyzed the NTSB’s commercial aviation
accident data for the ten-year period from 1990-2000.
This set of accidents includes Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) Part 121 scheduled and non-
scheduled operations and FAR Part 135 scheduled and
non-scheduled operations. From the original set of
1322 commercial aviation accidents, 781 were
identified as having human factors causes using the
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Sixty of
these accidents attributable at least in part to pilot error
contained 70 organizational cause factors. A
comprehensive analysis of these accidents was
performed using the NTSB’s assigned findings. (Note:
accidents relating to organizational factors associated
with maintenance facilities and maintenance issues
were not included in this analysis.)
Results
Of the 60 identified accidents, 73% produced some
type of injury or fatality, while only 27% resulted in
no injuries to crew or passengers (Table 1).
Table 1. Degree of injury sustained from 60








Within these accidents, 17 occurred in FAR Part 121
aviation  operations,  while  43  occurred  in  FAR  Part
135 aviation operations. When broken down into type
of hauling operation these accidents represent under
each certificate of operation, passenger-only
operations make up the largest category of accidents,
followed by cargo-only operations and then
passenger-cargo combined operations. A comparison
of the type of hauling operation these accidents
represent under each certificate of operation is
presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Comparison of type of hauling operation in







Part Scheduled 7 2 5
121 Non-scheduled 3
Part Scheduled 8 2
135 Non-scheduled 21 11 1
Assessing Organizational Factors
Assessing the assigned findings for the accident
sequence of events provided a more complete analysis
of the 70 organizational factors associated with the 60
accidents. We used the NTSB identified accident
sequence of events identified during the original
investigation. Based both on the descriptors provided
by the NTSB and a review of the narratives associated
with each of the factors, we were able to cluster these
organizational factors around 10 broad categories
which include procedures, training, surveillance,
standards, information, supervision, pressure,
documentation, substantiation, and facilities. A brief
description of these factors appears in Table 3.
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Table 3. Organizational contributing factors of 60 U.S. commercial aviation accidents 1990-2000 (clustered).
Category Description
Inadequate procedures or directives Ill-defined or conflicting policies
Formal oversight of operation
Inadequate initial, upgrade, or emergency
training/transition
Opportunities for pilot training not implemented
or made available to pilots (e.g., human resource
problem)
Inadequate surveillance of operations Organizational climate issues
Chain-of-command
Quality assurance and trend information




Logbooks, updates, and weather reports on the
part of the organization
Inadequate supervision of operations
(management level)
Failure to provide guidance, oversight, and
leadership to flight operations
Company/management induced pressure Threats to pilot job status and/or pay
Faulty documentation Inaccurate checklists, signoffs, and company
record keeping that effects flight operations





Inadequate facilities Failure to provide adequate environmental
controls, lighting, clearance, etc. for flight
operations
When these organizational cause factors are
considered in relation to operational category (Table
4), a clearer picture of the elements related to
aviation operations emerges.
Accident factors related to inadequate organizational
procedures emerge prominently in both Part 121 and
Part 135 operations, with 7 instances (9.5%) in Part
121 and 8 instances (11.5%) in Part 135 operations.
The factors associated with inadequate training are
significantly higher in Part 135 operations (16%),
than in Part 121 operations (3%). Inadequate
surveillance of operations also ranks higher in Part
135 operations (10.5%) than in Part 121 operations
(3%), as do inadequate standards/requirements at 9%
and 3%, respectively. Inadequate information sharing
ranks higher in Part 121 accidents (7%), than in Part
135 operations (4.5%). Accident factors associated
with inadequate supervision, which includes
management oversight, are present in Part 135
operations (10.5%) but not in Part 121 operations, as
are factors associated with company-induced pressure
(6%) and inadequate facilities (1.5%).
Discussion
A strong reason for the discrepancy of accident
distribution between the operative categories could
lie in the range of pilot non-flight duties, which
depends on the employment setting. Part 121 airline
pilots have the services of large support staffs, and
consequently perform few non-flight duties. Pilots
employed in other settings, such as Part 135
operations have duties other than flight
responsibilities. They may load the aircraft, handle
passenger baggage, supervise refueling, arrange for
major maintenance, or perform minor aircraft
maintenance and repair work.
This leads to a blurring of the supervisory chain of
command and can put one person in charge of
numerous supervisory issues, devoid of checks and
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Procedural 8% (6) 1.5% (1) 1.5% (1) 10% (7) 21%(15)
Training 3% (2) 12% (8) 4% (3) 18%(13)
Surveillance 1.5% (1) 1.5% (1) 1.5% (1) 9% (6) 13% (9)
Standards 3% (2) 3% (2) 6% (4) 12% (8)
Information 4% (3) 3% (2) 1.5% (1) 3% (2) 12% (8)
Supervision 1.5% (1) 9% (6) 10% (7)
Pressure 6% (4) 6% (4)
Documentation 3% (2) 1.5% (1) 4% (3)
Substantiation 1.5% (1) 1.5% (1) 3% (2)
Facilities 1.5% (1) 1.5% (1)
Percentages are approximate due to rounding.
balances, which they are not adequately equipped to
handle. This may also serve as a contributing factor
to the higher rate of inadequate supervisory and
surveillance accident factors at the Part 135
operations than at the Part 121 operations.
As  airlines  grow  larger,  the  problems  appear  to
display tendencies shifting from those of direct
supervisory and pressure, to those of a procedural,
informational, documentary nature. What this may
represent is a drift in the practical application of
safety concepts. Normal rote operations may shift
from time to time based on the accepted way work is
performed. These shifts may also become part of
organizational doctrine, as the safety rules for the
original procedure become lost in the presence of the
current context of work.  This conceptual drift
appears to contribute to the organizational factors
experienced in the larger air carriers where
procedural departures from routine become routine in
practice in the absence of documentation and
information sharing.  This may be due to the
hierarchical distance between the front line operators
and the upper level management where the procedure
is substantiated.
An abundance of factors occur toward the top of the
organizational chain. Indeed, problems with the
organization’s procedures were cited in a majority of
the accidents studied. The overarching organizational
process set by those in charge of establishing the
organization’s directives and procedures may come
into play that those in charge of setting policy are too
far removed from the actual job to adequately address
the issues involved. Perhaps it behooves those in
charge, in the policy area specifically, to be sure a
more bottom-up organizational approach is utilized to
incorporate the expertise of those who actually
perform the work with that of those who preside
over it.
Conclusion
This research provides an overview of the concept of
organizational safety as related to the human factors
perspective. We introduce a framework to objectively
identify organizational factors as related to pilot error
accidents. Once organizational factors are identified,
interventions aimed at the supervisory and
organizational levels of an establishment have the
potential to improve the entire system when
compared to issues at the operator level, which may
focus on alleviating just one error. Valuable resources
are better spent on prevention and control at the
organizational level, rather than on trying to fix,
after-the-fact, the inexhaustible ways people fail at
the operational level. With this, we have the potential
to eliminate a myriad of errors as opposed to the
proverbial Dutch boy putting his finger in the dam,
only to find numerous leaks exploding all around.
It bears mention that the accidents presented here are
assessed according to the NTSB’s findings of
probable cause. Other accidents may meet the criteria
of containing organizational cause factors, yet
organizational factors in accident investigations have
been historically overlooked and thusly not directly
traceable  as  such  in  any  findings.  As  a  result,  we
have not included them here, thus the number of
organizational accidents in commercial aviation may
be higher than reported here.
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